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Definition
Cognitive perspective in the study of individual
differences amounts to analyzing human traits in
terms of underlying cognitive processes. The way
in which we perceive the world, attend to the
external stimuli, store information in short-term
and long-term memory, or solve problems via
the process of thinking deﬁnes what we are like.
The cognitive perspective allows integration of
the psychology of individual differences with the
experimental cognitive psychology.
General Issues
Cognitive analysis of individual differences is a
relatively new approach in psychological science.
Contemporary cognitive psychology evolved in
the 1950s and 1960s as a continuation of the
traditional experimental psychology, whereas the
psychology of individual differences developed
from the so-called correlational psychology
(Cronbach 1957), also known as the differential
psychology. These two disciplines of scientiﬁc
psychology used to differ in basic theoretical and
methodological assumptions. Experimental psy-
chologists focused on the general rules of behav-
ior, thus ignoring the fact that one can hardly ﬁnd
two identically behaving animal subjects or
human participants. In typical experimental set-
tings, participants were expected to behave in the
speciﬁc manner due to deliberate experimental
manipulations, not because of their personal traits.
Therefore, individual differences were treated as
a source of unwanted variance that should be
reduced, if possible, because the greater such a
variance, the lower the chances to reject the null
hypothesis. Consequently, experimental psychol-
ogists were interested in making the groups of
participants as homogeneous as possible in refer-
ence to their temperament, personality, intelli-
gence, diligence, and other personal traits. In
contrast, differential psychologists were primarily
interested in between-person variability of traits;
therefore, they sought for the most differentiated
samples possible to ﬁnd. Since differential psy-
chologist relied mostly on the correlational
approach, their preference for large and diversi-
ﬁed samples was absolutely logical because
large amount of within-sample variance usually
increases the probability of ﬁnding signiﬁcant
correlations between various aspects of human
individuality. Restricted variance, on the other
hand, usually makes the investigated relationships
statistically not signiﬁcant. So, for the experimen-
tal psychologists, the phenomenon of individual
differences was somewhat uncomfortable as a
“noise,” whereas for the differential psychologist,
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who usually did not carry out controlled labora-
tory experiments, this phenomenon lied just in the
focus of their scientiﬁc interest.
Experimental and differential psychology have
been developing fairly in isolation until the 1970s,
when the pioneering studies by Earl Hunt (Hunt
et al. 1973; Hunt 1980) and Robert J. Sternberg
(1977) initiated fruitful combination of these two
perspectives. For instance, Earl Hunt and his
coworkers discovered that people of high verbal
ability, in comparison to less endowed persons,
were quicker in the basic cognitive operation of
letter comparison. An idea thus emerged that com-
plex intellectual abilities, investigated by differ-
ential psychologists, might result from the speed
of elementary cognitive operations, the
latter being investigated with the purely “non-
differential” paradigms developed by cognitive
psychologists. Robert J. Sternberg, on the other
hand, developed so-called componential analysis
that allowed splitting the general mental ability,
measured with IQ tests, into separate cognitive
building blocks (i.e., components). This approach
allowed deﬁnition of general intelligence in terms
of the cognitive process and its constituents rather
than in terms of a bit mythical entity comprising of
latent “factors.” In this way, Sternberg demon-
strated that the structural approach, typical of dif-
ferential psychology, may be, and should be,
accompanied by the processual approach, typical
of experimental cognitive psychology.
Today, the combination of experimental and
differential perspectives is a standard approach
in the study of individual differences, as well as
in the study of general cognition. Such a combi-
nation allows deeper insight into the nature of
both human individuality and human cognition.
Speciﬁcally, this approach consists in investiga-
tion of the following questions:
1. What are the cognitive correlates of various
dimensions of human individuality? Thanks to
this kind of research, psychologists accumulate
knowledge about cognitive aspects of such
traits as personality, intelligence, creativity, or
self-control.
2. If such a relationship is found, which factors
determine its strength? Precisely, such a
relationship may rely on speciﬁc components,
or stages, of the cognitive process. For
instance, Sternberg found that general intelli-
gence is related mostly to one speciﬁc compo-
nent of the process of analogical thinking,
namely, the operation of mapping one cogni-
tive structure against another one. Conse-
quently, the author suggested that speed and
accuracy of mapping might account for the
general factor of intelligence, whereas speed
or accuracy of other components did not count
very much. Alternatively, such a relationship
may appear only in speciﬁc experimental con-
ditions, characterized by increased cognitive
demands. For instance, Hunt and Lansman
found that high-ability people did not differ
from low-ability ones in the single-task condi-
tions but started to excel as soon as task con-
ditions became much more demanding, as is
the case of dual-task performance. Such ﬁnd-
ings are particularly interesting because they
may suggest possible theoretical explanation
of the nature of the trait versus process
relationships.
3. If such a relationship is found, what does it
mean in terms of the direction of causation?
This question is the most difﬁcult one because
correlational studies, including the structural
equation modeling (SEM) approach, do not
allow causal explanations. The latter usually
needs experimental manipulation with inde-
pendent variables. For instance, a relationship
between intelligence and dual-task perfor-
mance may suggest that (1) the multitasking
ability is determined by the general mental
ability, (2) intelligence is explained by the
multitasking ability as one of its underlying
determinants, or (3) there is a third element
(e.g., a neural or genetic factor) which deter-
mines both variables found to be correlated.
Since we cannot manipulate with the level of
intelligence, we must rely on indirect inference
or theoretical considerations. Fortunately, the
cognitive approach suggests promising ways
to get insight into the causal nature of many
correlational relationships. This is because
the strength of a relationship between two
variables may vary if one of them is
2 Cognitive Perspective
experimentally manipulated in reference to
speciﬁc cognitive requirements. Such an
approach is sometimes called a “quasi-
experimental approach” (Hambrick et al.
2005), and it consists in treating the correlation
between a measure of an elementary cognitive
function and a measure of a higher-order trait
as a dependent variable, whose value may ﬂuc-
tuate according to the experimental manipula-
tions with cognitive load.
Thus, the cognitive approach to individual dif-
ferences allows deeper understanding not only
how people differ one from another but also why
do they differ and what are the underlying factors
of important individual traits. For these reasons,
the cognitive perspective seems quite promising
from the methodological and theoretical point
of view.
Intelligence
The cognitive approach to intelligence started
with reaction time studies, which showed that IQ
was negatively correlated with both simple and
choice reaction time (Jensen 1998). Though reac-
tion time, as well as inspection time that also used
to be studied in this context (Deary 1994), is not a
cognitive process per se, it is believed to reﬂect an
important characteristic of cognition, namely, the
processing speed. Therefore, these ﬁndings cor-
roborated the hypothesis according to which intel-
ligence may be explained by speed of mental
processing, in other words, by the velocity of
elementary cognitive processes.
Today, the mainstream of research on cognitive
correlates of intelligence pertains to working
memory capacity (WMC), deﬁned as the ability
to memorize the incoming data for a short time
and to operate on them according to the current
task’s requirements. Models of working memory
emphasize its dual nature as both “a memory” and
a mental mechanism responsible for information
processing (Baddeley 1986). Two issues are
important while theorizing about the signiﬁcance
of WMC for human intellectual functioning.
Firstly, working memory is severely limited in
its capacity, deﬁned in terms of both the amount
of information possible to be maintained for a
short period of time and the duration of such
maintenance. Secondly, there are vast individual
differences in WMC that can be assessed with
dedicated tests, such as the OSPAN procedure.
In other words, people substantially differ in
their WMC, which – by the way – is subjected
to hard limitations. Hence, the question arises
whether individual differences in WMC correlate
with individual differences in other aspects of
human cognition, such as language processing,
problem solving, and general ﬂuid intelligence
(Gf). As to the relationships between WMC and
Gf, various studies demonstrated that these mea-
sures share from 50% to 70% of common variance
(Chuderski and Nęcka 2012). It means that the
cognitive processes involved in working memory
functioning explain the substantial part of the
general intellectual ability. It also implies that
WMC is probably the strongest known predictor
of Gf.
Having established the importance of WMC
for the general ﬂuid intelligence, researches
started to ask which aspects of working memory
are responsible for this link. Two answers may
be found in the literature. According to the ﬁrst
stance, it is the storage capacity of WM that
decides about the quality of abstract reasoning
and – consequently – the level of intelligence.
Storage capacity is not synonymous with working
memory capacity (WMC); rather, it is just one of
its determinants. Storage capacity may be deﬁned
in terms of the number of chunks of information
possible to be stored and actively maintained for a
short time, whereas WMC is a term pertaining to
the general efﬁciency of the working memory
mechanism. Apart from storage capacity, WMC
is determined by speed and efﬁcacy of speciﬁc
operations performed by WM, such as substitu-
tion of elements, inhibition of intrusions, or speed
of removal of elements that are not relevant any-
more. If general ﬂuid intelligence is determined
mostly by storage capacity, it may be predicted on
the basis of the so-called span tests that allow
assessment of the number of elements possible
to hold in memory for a short time.
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According to the second stance, general ﬂuid
intelligence depends on the function of controlled
attention. For instance, Nelson Cowan (1995)
claims that working memory is just the active
part of long-term memory. Activated chunks of
information are ready for use in current pro-
cessing, whereas less active ones have to be
activated ﬁrst. Controlled attention is one of
the mechanisms that subserve such activation.
Therefore, the efﬁciency of cognitive control
determines the overall capacity of working mem-
ory. Consequently, it also determines the general
level of intelligence. Randall Engle and his team
(Engle et al. 1999) share this stance, claiming that
efﬁcacy of cognitive control, particularly efﬁcacy
of controlled attention, is the most important
determinant of Gf.
Standard working memory tests do not allow
clear conclusion concerning these two competing
accounts of the nature of Gf/WMC relationship.
For instance, the OSPAN test that is usually
employed in these studies consists in simulta-
neous performance of two tasks. The ﬁrst task
needs veriﬁcation of series of the arithmetic equa-
tions, and the second one needs remembering
words that appear at the end of every equation
formula. In such a way, OSPAN engages two
theoretically relevant aspects of working memory,
namely, storage and processing. However, it does
not allow splitting these two aspects at the mea-
surement level in order to verify the competing
hypotheses about the Gf/WMC relationship. In
order to do so, researchers have to employ two
independent batteries ofWM tasks, one pertaining
mostly to storage capacity and another one relat-
ing mainly to executive control. Another solution
amounts to employment of one task that provides
independent markers of storage capacity and
executive control. For instance, a special version
of n-back task meets these requirements. In this
task, a series of stimuli (e.g., two-digit numbers)
appear and disappear at the screen one by one. The
task is to recognize repetition of any stimulus that
has been already presented n items back.
Manipulation with the number n makes the task
more or less difﬁcult, since recognition is easy in
the case of immediate repetition (e.g., 56, 56,
n = 1) and it gets quite difﬁcult if it is mediated
by other elements (e.g., 56, 78, 42, 56, n = 3).
Additionally, the sequence of stimuli may involve
lures, that is, stimuli that are repeated too early or
too late and thus should be ignored. For instance,
if the participants are instructed that n = 2, the
repetitions on the position n = 1 or n = 3 are just
irrelevant lures, although they may prompt impul-
sive erroneous responses. In such a research par-
adigm, the number of correct responses to targets
(e.g., n = 2) is a measure of storage capacity,
whereas the number of correct rejection of lures
(e.g., n= 1 or n= 3) is a measure of the efﬁcacy of
inhibitory control. Adopting such a methodology,
we (Chuderski and Nęcka 2012) were able to
establish that storage capacity is a stronger pre-
dictor of Gf than executive control. However,
impurity of tasks used in cognitive experiments,
including the n-back task, prompted us to adopt
still another approach, in which we used two
batteries of various tasks pertaining more to stor-
age capacity than executive control, or vice versa.
Using the structural equation modeling (SEM),
we were able to demonstrate that the latent vari-
able pertaining to executive control has very lim-
ited explanatory power concerning Gf, whereas
storage capacity explains almost the entire pool of
Gf variance (Chuderski et al. 2012).
It is still far from clear which aspects of work-
ing memory predict general ﬂuid intelligence.
According to the relational integration hypothesis,
intelligence depends on the ability to create tem-
porary bindings between mental representations
in order to obtain more complex relational struc-
tures (Oberauer et al. 2007). The process of bind-
ing is believed to be crucial for abstract reasoning,
because it allows speedy combination and recom-
bination of premises that allow suitable conclu-
sion. What counts in relational integration is both
the number of representations possible to bind in
memory for a short time and the speed with
which old bindings are replaced with new ones.
Efﬁciency of these processes is claimed to be the
best predictor of the quality of abstract reasoning
(Chuderski 2014), also known as general ﬂuid
intelligence.
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Self-Control
Self-control is an ability to deﬁne and pursue
long-distance goals in spite of situational inﬂu-
ences, external pressures, or current physiological
needs of the organism. It is an important predictor
of life success, including health, wealth, and
social status. Its failures may be observed when
somebody loses control over his/her own behavior
and yields to the current impulses, usually at the
expense of future gains.
Self-control may be conceptualized as both a
process and a trait. As a process, it consists
of several stages playing various roles in self-
regulation of behavior (see Kotabe and Hofmann
2015). First of all, a person must realize that there
is a conﬂict between one of his/her long-distance
goals and a current desire or temptation. For
instance, the goal to obtain university degree,
which requires years of hard work and effort,
may be difﬁcult to bring together with the
need to socialize or with a temptation to prolong
vacationing. People usually strive for many goals
of different importance and urgency, so they must
learn how to combine them with their limited
resources, such as time and energy necessary to
exert sustained control over their behavior. But
primarily they must be able to detect conﬂict
between the goals, particularly between important
long-distance objectives and transient desires.
The next stage consists in mobilization of
resources necessary to exert control. Acts of self-
control are costly in terms of energy and effort,
meaning that people are less likely to control
themselves after having completed demanding
tasks. The so-called “ego depletion” effect
(Baumeister et al. 2007) has been demonstrated
in the sequence task paradigm, where people are
asked to do a task that requires controlled atten-
tion (e.g., the Stroop task) after having done
another task of similar nature (e.g., trying not to
read subtitles while watching a movie). Although
the “ego depletion” effect (Baumeister et al. 1998)
is hotly debated concerning its strength and under-
lying mechanisms, it has been convincingly dem-
onstrated that acts of self-control deprive us a
portion of our cognitive and/or energetic
resources needed either to continue this very act
of self-control or to start a new effortful task.
Hence, detection of the conﬂict between a long-
distance goal and a current desire must be
followed by mobilization or restoration of ener-
getic as well as cognitive resources; otherwise the
process of self-control is likely to fail. The third
stage consists in enactment of effective motiva-
tion to exert self-control. It happens that a person
is able to detect the goal vs. desire conﬂict, as well
as he/she has enough resources available, and still
self-control is not exerted due to lack of the deci-
sion to do so. In other words, an act of self-control
must be consciously decided upon if it is to take
place at all, the more so that there are usually
many competing goals of equal or even higher
attractiveness. Finally, a person who decided to
exert self-control must ﬂexibly adjust to the ever-
changing conditions of the environment. It means
that he/she has to (1) maintain the important long-
distance goal in working memory; (2) inhibit
unwanted reactions, impulses, thoughts, or feel-
ings; and (3) switch from one action to another
according to requirements of the current situation.
As a trait, self-control is a relatively stable
disposition with a considerable predictive power
concerning various measures of life success
(Casey et al. 2011). It may be conceptualized as
the individual ability to perform properly and
effectively the abovementioned stages of the pro-
cess of self-control. There are individual differ-
ences in the ability to detect conﬂict between
long-distance goals and current desires, as well
as in the ability to mobilize resources, to motivate
oneself for the exertion of self-control, and to
ﬂexibly adjust one’s behavior to the requirements
caused by the current situation. In other words,
every stage of the process of self-control may
succeed or fail, and the (low) probability of fail-
ures implies (high) level of the trait of self-control.
This dimension of individual differences is stable
enough to serve as a correlate of income, profes-
sional achievement, and life satisfaction.
The trait of self-control is measured in two
ways. The ﬁrst group of assessment tools includes
questionnaires, such as the Self-Control Scale
(Tangney et al. 2004) or the NAS-50 scale
(Nęcka et al. 2016). These questionnaires consist
of items referring to various real-life situations in
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which one’s self-control may succeed or fail. For
instance, a person is asked about his/her ability
to maintain goals, adaptively switch from one
action to another, inhibit unwanted actions, or do
deadlines. Although the self-control question-
naires show good psychometric characteristics
concerning reliability and validity, they are criti-
cized for relying on people’s self-awareness,
which may be far from perfect as far as the control
abilities are concerned. For these reasons, scales
of self-control are sometimes constructed in both
the ﬁrst-person and the third-person versions (e.g.,
Nęcka et al. 2016), the latter allowing assessment
provided by informants (i.e., family members,
coworkers, colleagues). The second group of
tools consists of standardized observational scales
(e.g., Mofﬁtt et al. 2011), thanks to which infor-
mants (e.g., parents or teachers) can provide infor-
mation about the participant’s level of self-control
exerted in real-life situations. The observational
scales do not rely on self-reporting, so they are
regarded more valuable assessment tools in com-
parison to typical questionnaires. However, such
scales are suitable only for careful and attentive
informants, who are not easily found in typical
research paradigms.
Cognitive underpinnings of trait self-control
are called executive functions (EF). These
higher-order processes are responsible for adap-
tive control and coordination of cognition in the
service of goal-directed activity. According to the
popular taxonomy by Akira Miyake and his
coworkers (Miyake et al. 2000), there are three
major EFs: inhibition, shifting, and working
memory updating. The ﬁrst function is responsi-
ble for prepotent response inhibition when such a
response would be harmful or at least inappropri-
ate. Suppression of one’s inclination to offend
another person may be a good example of efﬁcient
inhibitory control. The second function, shifting,
is responsible for adaptive switching between
different tasks, types of activity, or mindsets.
Inefﬁcient shifting results either in perseverance
instead of switching into another action or at least
in the increased costs of switching (i.e., longer
response time or higher probability of error).
People who tend to repeat the same joke in every
occasion seem to suffer from inefﬁcient shifting.
The third function is working memory updating,
thanks to which people are aware of the current
situation and its cognitive requirements. People
who do not update their working memory store
quickly and properly tend to respond to irrelevant
cues or are lost in their inner mental states, thus
neglecting the demands caused by current tasks.
The list of executive functions proposed by
Miyake is probably not complete. First of all, it
lacks the function of planning, without which acts
of self-control cannot be exerted. Next, the func-
tion of dual- or multitasking is worth consider-
ation. Efﬁcient self-control often requires that
more than one action is necessary to perform,
and people vary extensively in terms the multi-
tasking abilities. Another problem connected with
the Miyake model pertains to “unity and diver-
sity” of executive functions, which amounts to
the question of their mutual intercorrelations. It
appears the function of shifting is the least
connected with others, whereas the function of
inhibition tends to be the most general. Even
though EFs are interrelated, they are still speciﬁc
enough to account for very special aspects of self-
control, which means that the trait of self-control
should be investigated and assessed according to
multidimensional models consisting of several
subscales rather than one general factor (see
Nęcka et al. 2016).
The major problem concerning the cognitive
underpinnings of self-control amounts to the fact
that those executive functions pertain mostly to
the third stage of the process of self-control. This
ﬁnal step of ﬂexible implementation of behavioral
plans is probably the best investigated from the
cognitive point of view, because we can argue that
working memory updating is responsible for goal
maintenance, inhibitory control (for abstaining
from unwanted or improper actions), and task
switching (for adaptive adjustment of behavior).
However, there is not enough knowledge
concerning the cognitive aspects of other stages
of the process of self-control, such as conﬂict
detection, setting up effective motivation, and
mobilization of resources.
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Personality
One of the basic issues discussed in the ﬁeld of the
psychology of personality is the trait versus situ-
ation problem. For traditional differential psy-
chologists, these are stable dispositions (i.e.,
traits) that determine human behavior and make
it relatively invariant across situations. According
to such an explanation, an aggressive person will
demonstrate increased probability of violent
behavior regardless of current situational factors,
although the situation may moderate the likeli-
hood of aggression; it may also inﬂuence the
way in which aggressive acts would occur. This
line of theorizing is particularly popular among
the differential psychologists who search for
genetic predispositions of personality traits. For
the proponents of situational explanations, it is the
current situation that inﬂuences human behavior
most, particularly the social cues. These theorists
maintain that the same person may behave in the
aggressive or peaceful way depending on such
factors as the presence or absence of speciﬁc
triggers of aggression or the way other people
behave at the same time.
The trait versus situation debate has been
addressed by Walter Mischel and Shoda (1995)
who developed the so-called cognitive-affective
model of personality. The authors do not ignore
the fact that human behavior is consistent across
different situations; however, they ascribe much
more signiﬁcance to the consistency within situa-
tions. For instance, aggression is likely to appear
again and again in an individual life history only if
the characteristics of situations are repeated, too.
In another situation the same person may respond
in the peaceful and cooperative way, thus
suggesting that he/she lacks any “disposition to
aggression” or maybe he/she has the “disposition
to agreeableness.” Instead of relying in disposi-
tional accounts, Mischel and Shoda underscore
the importance of the “if-then” patterns that com-
bine situational factors (i.e., if something hap-
pens) with speciﬁc behavioral outcomes (i.e.,
then a given response is produced). The “if-
then” patterns are formed and stored in the
cognitive-affective personality system (CAPS),
thanks to which human behavior is both depen-
dent on the situation and constant over time.
The CAPS system involves ﬁve units, namely,
(1) encoding, storage, and use of information,
(2) beliefs and expectations concerning the
outcomes of one’s actions, (3) goals and values
that determine one’s motivation, (4) affective pat-
terns of responding in a given situation, and
(5) competencies, such as knowledge and abili-
ties. Personality is deﬁned as a unique pattern of
these units, thanks to which effective regulation of
behavior is possible.
Michel and Shoda’s model of personality is
a good example of the cognitive approach.
According to this stance, human personality is
determined by the way in which we perceive and
understand the world, other people, and ourselves
as well. The classic example of such an approach
is George Kelly’s (1995) theory of personal con-
structs. The author assumes that people are naïve
scientists, meaning that they construct and verify
hypotheses about the world, especially the social
world. The personally veriﬁed hypotheses are
becoming parts of the system of personal con-
structs, which allow understanding what is going
on in the environment and predicting what is
likely to happen next. Such personal constructs
are relatively constant over time, for two reasons.
First, they are the result of hard work and effort, so
they tend to be defended as long as new evidence
suggests their rejection or modiﬁcation. Second,
they are parts of the complex system, so any
change of a given construct may be consequential
for other constructs. Therefore, human behavior
regulated by the system of personal constructs is
relatively stable across situations. It is also highly
idiosyncratic, that is, typical for a given person
who usually differs from other people in the way
he/she behaves in the given circumstances. The
theory of personal constructs is a perfect example
of the cognitive approach because it underscores
the role of cognition both in the regulation of
behavior and in the process of personality devel-
opment, the latter being just the process of build-
ing the system of personal construct through
veriﬁcation of hypotheses.
Apart from developing the cognitive models of
personality as a system of behavior regulation that
relies on the way people perceive and understand
the world, the cognitive perspective may lead to
quite another research agenda. This research area
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is involved in studying how various personality
traits affect cognitive functioning. Personality
dimensions assessed with standard psychometric
tools are treated as possible moderators of general
rules of cognition, investigated within the exper-
imental paradigm. Within such an approach,
Błażej Szymura (2010) found that three super-
factors of personality conceptualized by Hans
J. Eysenck (1967, 1981) inﬂuence the functioning
of attention, although the nature of such inﬂuence
depends on the particular dimension. The dimen-
sion of extraversion/introversion appeared impor-
tant for dual tasking, since extraverts tended to
outperform introverts when the task conditions
required that two tasks be performed simulta-
neously. Neuroticism appeared relevant for the
attentional function of selectivity because the
data suggested that highly neurotic persons com-
mitted performed worse than the emotionally sta-
ble people when task conditions required rapid
selection of relevant items and ignoring irrelevant
ones. When the speed of presentation was not
increased, neuroticism did not predict perfor-
mance in the attention test. Finally, the trait
of psychoticism moderated performance in the
sustained attention test, suggesting that people
characterized by high level of the P trait suffer
from inability to sustain attention over time. In
other studies, the P trait also showed signiﬁcant
relationships with leaks of attention, that is, the
impaired ability to screen out currently irrelevant
stimuli.
Studies showing that personality traits are apt
to moderate the outcomes of cognitive processes,
andmaybe their progression as well, are important
for several reasons. Firstly, they happen to be
relevant for the theoretical debates concerning
the nature and structure of personality. For
instance, Szymura (2010) claims that his research
ﬁndings support the biological model of person-
ality suggested by H. J. Eysenck. Secondly, these
ﬁndings suggest that general rules of cognition are
not that general as they are sometimes believed to
be. Individual differences should not be treated as
a “noise” contaminating the results of “purely”
cognitive experiments. Finally, such ﬁndings
may have practical implications because they sug-
gest that people characterized by some personality
dispositions should not be recruited for jobs
characterized by speciﬁc cognitive requirements.
The studies on personality correlates of attention
seem particularly important form this point
of view.
Conclusion
The science of individual differences emerged
as an attempt to describe and understand the
phenomenon of interindividual differentiation of
human behavior. Between-person differences
in responding to external stimuli had to be
accounted for in terms of underlying factors.
Broadly speaking, there are three modes of expla-
nation adopted by the scholars of individual
differences, corresponding to three levels of the-
orizing. The ﬁrst one amounts to looking for
genetic determination of individual traits. The
second one consists in linking individual traits
with pertinent neural mechanisms. The third one
relies on construction of cognitive models of
human personal traits. Thus, the cognitive per-
spective is just one of a few possible ways to
grasp the problem of interindividual differentia-
tion of human behavior. All perspectives should
be taken together in order to obtain deeper
understanding of intelligence, self-control, and
personality.
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